THE agency dealing with Australia's uranium exports is making an absurd claim.

The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office says Australia sells uranium only to countries with "impeccable" non-proliferation credentials.

In fact, Australia has uranium export agreements with nuclear weapon states that are failing to fulfil their disarmament obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Australia is also dealing with states with a history of covert nuclear weapons research based on their "civil" nuclear programs.

The Australian Government permits uranium sales to countries, including the United States, which are blocking progress on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

This is supported by the Safeguards Office and the Government proposes allowing uranium sales to India, which is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This is a serious blow to the international non-proliferation regime, yet has been met with silence from the Safeguards Office.

Last year's debate on uranium sales to China showed the Safeguards Office at its worst.

The Safeguards Office did not know the number of nuclear facilities in China, nor which of these would process uranium and its by-products.

The Safeguards Office was dismissive of China having the worst record of exports of proliferation-sensitive materials and know-how of any of the nuclear weapon states.

The Safeguards Office claims that all nuclear materials derived from Australia's uranium exports are "fully accounted for".

But that claim is false. There are frequent accounting discrepancies involving Australia's nuclear exports.

What the Safeguards Office means when it says that nuclear material is "fully accounted for" is that it has accepted all the explanations provided by uranium customer countries for accounting discrepancies, however fanciful those explanations may be.

Perhaps the most misleading of the claims made by the Safeguards Office is its repeated assertion that nuclear power does not present a weapons proliferation risk.

In fact, power reactors have been used directly in weapons programs.

Some examples include India, which is reserving eight out of 22 power reactors for weapons production.

The inevitable conclusion arising from our detailed critique of the Safeguards Office is that, at best, it is ineffectual.

At worst, the Safeguards Office serves the commercial interests of the nuclear industry and the political interests of those who promote it.

It contributes more to the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation than to the solutions.

We call on the Federal Government to establish an independent public inquiry to review all aspects of the Safeguards Office.

The inquiry should be adequately resourced, and should have powers similar to those of a royal commission.