Monday, 20 August, 2007

by Leslie Kemeny
The Australian

IN 2006, India and the US signed an agreement, which was designed to put India on the same basis as China in relation to international trade in nuclear technology and materials. For trade with the US, Congress needs to ratify it, and for wider trade, the International Nuclear Suppliers Group must agree.

Such decisions will undoubtedly influence Australian attitudes towards uranium sales to India. The matter is being debated by the National Security Committee of cabinet and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer hopes to conclude a bilateral safeguards agreement with India.

International Atomic Energy Agency director-general Mohamed El-Baradei welcomed the US initiatives, which related to the implementation of an earlier in-principle one drafted in mid-2005.

This involved some separation of military and civil nuclear facilities, with the latter representing some 65 per cent of India's nuclear plant being placed under international safeguards.

India has 15 operating nuclear power reactors plus eight more under construction. One of these a fast breeder. It also has five operating research reactors - two very large ones are apparently military plutonium producers, and one a 40MW (thermal) fast-breeder. It appears that the fast-breeder unit will be excluded from safeguards.

Pakistan and China are exploring a similar agreement, but the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the US have indicated that they would not relax trade rules for Pakistan in the light of its track record of proliferation.

For India, neither Australia nor Canada will relax embargoes, at present, but Russia, France and Britain support the US diplomatic moves.

India's different status to China arises from the fact that its first nuclear explosion was in May 1974, just after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came into operation. By contrast, China got in as a weapons state, without any stigma on account of its military nuclear program.

Through missing the boat, India has been faced with the prospect of either staying outside the NPT - as it had done, or abandoning its weapons program. Its assessment of regional security needs means it has maintained the weapons program as a high priority. One can fell a degree of sympathy for this position and its geopolitical rationale.

India is the world's most populous democracy. This year it happens to be celebrating the 60th year of its independence. During this period it has had a unique exposure to both the good and bad aspects of nuclear developments.

It has been one of the global pioneers of civilian nuclear power technology and it is on this basis that India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh came to Australia in 2006 to request Australian uranium.

In the 1960s prime minister Jawarharlal Nehru, a science graduate from Cambridge University, established the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. He would have known full well that under its first chairman, nuclear physicist Homi Bhabha, the development of a highly sophisticated nuclear research facility could provide the option of constructing a bomb.

In 1962-63 China defeated India in border skirmishes in the Himalayas. And, in October 1964 China exploded its first nuclear device. The Indian government was traumatised by these events and the rapid developments in Chinese missile technology.

Subsequently, when in 1971 Pakistan's defeat by India led to the formation of Bangladesh, Pakistan's prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto decided to offset India's overwhelming military edge by launching its own nuclear weapons program. This belligerence caused prime minister Indira Ghandi to authorise, in 1973, preparations for India's first nuclear test explosion.

It was in the mid-70s that I undertook an Indian lecture tour devoted to the subject of nuclear power station safety siting and surveillance. I well remember the Australian high commission in Delhi suggesting that I not visit the Indian Atomic Energy Commission as a part of my itinerary.

I also clearly recall the embarrassment felt by many Indian nuclear scientists and engineers as they explained to me the geopolitical realities of a potential confrontation with the belligerent neighbours, Pakistan and China, and their nation's covert venture into proliferation.

As pointed out by Prime Minister John Howard and Downer, Australia's observance of the NPT precludes the export of nuclear material to non-signatory countries. However, India is acknowledged by the IAEA as one of three unrecognised and undeclared nuclear-weapon states. The others are Pakistan and Israel.

For the IAEA, and indeed the global community, to have any of these three countries drawn closer into the framework of the NPT and to have all their nuclear activities declared and inspected is a major benefit that is actively encouraged.

Such compliance will carry its own rewards, and in the longer term for India it might mean access to Australian uranium.

Leslie Kemeny is the Australian foundation member of the International Nuclear Energy Academy who has closely monitored nuclear developments in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.