Australia is backing a nuclear rogue
Monday, 20 August, 2007
by Andy Butfoy
The Age
Of course, there is a case for selling uranium to India. It's one that tends to reflect the views of the US neo-cons who laid much of the groundwork for the idea. Advocates of the exports often pin their case on three points. First, they can play the global warming card, although this mostly looks like tactical positioning rather than a genuine motive. Second, they say it's a moral nonsense for the rules to ban civil nuclear sales to a democracy such as India, while simultaneously permitting sales to an authoritarian state such as China just because Beijing has signed arms control agreements. Third, armchair strategists think India can be used to balance the growing power of China.
Where does the nuclear non-proliferation treaty figure here? It doesn't, except in a few limited regards. For a start, it's sometimes said (although not by Downer) that the NPT has passed its use-by date. This is simplistic rhetoric more than analysis, but it serves the purpose of making it easier to paint India's refusal to sign as irrelevant. Unfortunately, this approach risks turning the collapse of the NPT into a reckless self-fulfilling prophecy.
Then we are told Australia's hands are clean because inspections will ensure our material won't find its way into Indian weapons. However, imports from here can be used to free other sources of uranium for India's military.
Finally, it's asserted India has a good record and acts in a manner consistent with the spirit of the NPT. This last claim has been a favourite mantra of media supporters of the deal eager to display their supposed expertise on the subject. The Government seems to have settled on this line as the key selling point of its policy.
This marketing pitch should be put into perspective, an exercise that also reveals how far Downer has been prepared to twist around on the topic. Here it's worth stepping back a few years.
In the 1990s Australia, more than any other country, was responsible for getting near universal backing for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty — despite strong opposition from India. The Labor and Liberal governments of the time had much to be proud of as the CTBT was widely seen as the key next step in reinforcing the NPT. In 1998 Downer said: "The pivotal role we played in the negotiation and adoption of the CTBT is a reflection of our commitment to the global nuclear non-proliferation … regime. This regime is central to our national security."
As Downer explained "One of the great achievements of the CTBT is to provide a codified international benchmark against which the actions of individual members of the international community … can be judged.
"Countries which defy this code of behaviour, as India and Pakistan have done, know that they can expect to feel the full weight of international opprobrium."
Just two years ago Downer was president of an international conference given the task of bringing the CTBT into legal force, something that requires, among other things, a reversal of Indian policy.
He spoke of his "unwavering support" for the treaty and his determination to take it forward, saying it would be "a decisive contribution to world peace and stability for generations to come". He explicitly argued that a suspension of tests was not an acceptable substitute for full treaty ratification. Moreover, he said of those not ratifying: "We have over the years heard many reasons why this is so. The time for excuses is past. It is time for them to act." India ignored the appeal.
No matter. Canberra has now sold out, and is backing a re-write of the internationally agreed rules on nuclear trade for the sake of a country that has repeatedly spat on the CTBT. (At least Russia, another market just opened for business by the government, supports the treaty.) Even today India insists deals with foreign governments will not constrain its nuclear weapons program, including its stance on testing. And this stance has been reckless, bloody-minded and provocative. Only signing and ratifying the CTBT will fix the damage.
The global rules on nuclear exports are laid down by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Sensibly, the NSG keeps countries that refuse to sign the NPT on the outer. However, if the US and Australia have their way, this provision will be blown apart.
Downer should reflect on a key line from the NSG's webpage. It says: "The NSG was created following the explosion in 1974 of a nuclear device by a (previously) non-nuclear-weapon state, which demonstrated that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused." The country in question was India; it had lied and bombed its way into the nuclear club. Australia will now be seen as tacitly endorsing this strategy.
Andy Butfoy is a lecturer in international relations at Monash University.