Monday, 20 August, 2007

by Ramesh Thakur
The Canberra Times

WHEN India became independent 60 years ago on August 15, its nationalist leaders were greatly impressed by supposed Soviet economic and industrial achievements, distrustful of unbridled capitalism, disdainful of US consumerism, and prone to lecture Western countries on neoimperialism while tilting the non-aligned group toward Russia. Americans found India's implied moral equivalence deeply offensive and hypocritical.

The end of the Cold War and the triple triumph of United States power, liberal ideology and market economy caused a painful reappraisal of the basic assumptions guiding domestic and foreign policy. The loss of Soviet patronage left India strategically exposed; the implosion of the Soviet Union underlined the vulnerability of the state-directed model of economic management; the extraordinary economic rise of China and the rapid modernisation of its military caused grave national security disquiet; and the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty raised fears of a de facto foreclosure of the nuclear option.

In 1998 India broke out of the closing nuclear trap by conducting a series of nuclear tests that Pakistan quickly mimicked. A shocked international community responded by imposing sanctions that were ineffectual and mostly softened or withdrawn, as strategic imperatives and the nature of the enemy changed after September 11, 2001. The danger of rogue states or terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons became a more critical security threat than responsible states having them. The discovery of the scale of the global nuclear bazaar run clandestinely by the hero of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, A.Q. Khan, broke the de facto moral equivalence within which India had been viewed in Western capitals.

Against this backdrop, an agreement was signed for sharing US civilian nuclear technology with India in return for India agreeing not to export weapons technology, maintain the moratorium on testing, separate military and civilian nuclear programs and subject those parts of the latter receiving international assistance to a rigorous inspection regime. The deal was consummated during President George W. Bush's visit to India in March 2006 and received overwhelming but qualified endorsements in both houses of Congress within the year. Intensive negotiations followed to address remaining areas of domestic concern in both countries. The resulting final text was issued this month. It seems to meet most of India's concerns but may yet run afoul of the non-proliferation constituency in Congress and the world. India must first negotiate agreements, with US help and support, with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Suppliers Group that includes Canada and Australia.

There is much to commend it. Politically, it consolidates the burgeoning relationship between the world's most powerful and populous democracies. Strategically, it establishes a powerful South Asian beachhead as a potential flanking option should relations with China deteriorate for either country. Economically, it will lead to many contracts for Western firms hoping to operate in the world's second most-vibrant large economy, open and expand the Indian energy market, and consolidate India's market-friendly policies while integrating it more firmly into the international economy. Australia's uranium industry clearly sees a bonanza.

But the most momentous consequence will likely be on the energy front. The dynamic growths of China and India have fed their voracious appetites for energy. The phenomenal rise in global energy consumption has coincided with rising oil prices, which has greatly increased the attractiveness of nuclear energy. India has 14 nuclear reactors in commercial operation and another eight under construction. The share of India's electricity sourced from nuclear power is expected to climb from 3per cent to 25per cent by 2050. It has limited coal and uranium reserves but about 25per cent of the world's thorium reserves. While this will fuel its nuclear power growth in the long term, it needs large uranium supplies in the meantime from countries like Australia (which has already given positive signals) and Canada (which has yet to commit itself one way or the other).

The India-US deal seeks to make the best of an increasingly untenable status quo. Of India's 22 reactors, 14 will come under international inspection compared with none today while eight will be designated military reactors. All material and equipment transferred to India by the US will be subject to international safeguards. Thus, the effective, practical choice is not between 100 per cent and 64per cent coverage, but between zero and 64 per cent coverage. Similarly, under the rigid terms of the treaty, the strategic reality of three non-treaty countries actually having the bomb cannot be acknowledged. No one has produced a credible road map of how India, Israel and Pakistan can be made to give up their weapons while five others keep them. The new deal seeks to move beyond three decades of futile lecturing to India and bring it inside the non-proliferation tent.

Much opposition to the India-US deal rests on a basic flaw which opponents pretend does not exist. If nuclear weapons are intrinsically dangerous, then the five declared nuclear powers, despite promises to eliminate the weapons, are equally culpable in the growing nuclear menace. If nuclear weapons did not exist, they could not proliferate. Because they do, they will.

If, however, nuclear weapons serve good purposes in responsible hands but are dangerous in the wrong hands, then India's exemplary record justifies the Bush Administration's decision to assist India with its civilian nuclear program while allowing it to keep nuclear weapons. Frankly, China's proliferation record, vis-a-vis Pakistan and North Korea, is rather more suspicious than India's. The mention of North Korea, Iran and others is a red herring. These countries have signed the treaty and are legally bound by its provisions; India, Pakistan and Israel have not signed. Nor has India ever been a factor in Iran's or North Korea's security calculations in embracing or eschewing nuclear weapons.

So, if we want a nuclear-free world which I certainly do let us bring full pressure to bear on all the eight nuclear powers, proportionate to the size of their arsenals. Alternatively, if we want to sacrifice that ideal on the altar of realism and/or expediency, let us embrace a fellow-democratic country with an impeccable record on non-proliferation.

Ramesh Thakur is distinguished fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation and professor of political science at the University of Waterloo. His most recent book is War in Our Time: Reflections on Iraq, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction.