Wednesday, 15 August, 2007

The Age - Opinion

There is a case for supplying uranium to India, but only in accordance with a revised globalnon-proliferation regime.

THE Non-Proliferation Treaty is the linchpin of a global regime that has largely succeeded in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons since it came into force 37 years ago. When cabinet's national security committee met yesterday to consider the sale of uranium to India, one of four non-signatories to the treaty, it was also deciding whether Australia would be part of a radical shift away from a longstanding consensus on non-proliferation. It has come

to this point with startling haste. As recently

as May, Resources Minister Ian Macfarlane insisted Australia would not sell to a non-signatory, which would also breach the rules of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group. "The Australian uranium industry can prosper without India," he said. This is because demand from the 30 countries now generating 16 per cent of the world's electricity from 435 nuclear reactors will continue to exceed supply.

In 2005, when US President George Bush undertook to "work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy co-operation and trade with India", Foreign Minister Alexander Downer effectively articulated the risks of compromising the proven principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The treaty originated after the Cuban missile crisis when US president John Kennedy warned against a world with an extra 20 to 30 nuclear powers. About 30 countries had that potential, but only the four that have not signed the treaty — India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea — have gained nuclear weapons. While visiting India in March last year, Prime Minister John Howard raised the possibility of

selling uranium, later adding that there was "no current intention" to do so. But he was loitering with intent and the Government has been less than open about this, at the expense of proper debate about the implications.

Not that all the implications are bad. The economic and political benefits to Australia in supplying India are obvious, as with last year's decision to sell uranium to China. The shift is being driven by the US-India deal, finalised last month, which opens 14 reactors to the scrutiny of the International Atomic Energy Agency (India has 22 reactors, but military facilities remain off limits). One can see political pragmatism at work, as Australia snubs global giants at its peril, but nuclear power could also reduce greenhouse emissions even as India and China, home to a third of the world population, enjoy rapid economic growth.

Now that the US has opened the back door, it may be time to acknowledge India as a de facto member of the nuclear club since 1974, in which time it has not spread its nuclear know-how. But none of that alters Australia's obligation to honour the treaties it signs. Before it ships any uranium it should ensure the deal conforms to an updated multilateral agreement, so non-proliferation is strengthened, not weakened. It is in that context that IAEA director-general Mohamed ElBaradei cautiously greeted the US-India accord as a "creative break with the past". Australia should also push for agreements that ban the production of fissile material for weapons and their testing. (Will Australia still supply India if it again tests its weapons as it did in 1998?)

With 36 per cent of the world's low-cost uranium reserves, this country is in a position to lead the way in non-proliferation, not just follow. If Australia is going to supply the world it has a duty to secure the whole nuclear cycle. It can best do so by accepting the waste for storage, thus ensuring spent fuel is not reprocessed for use in weapons. This "return

to supplier" principle is the key to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership set up by Mr Bush in 2005. Few other countries have our uninhabited space and geological stability, and Australia has spent 25 years developing a ceramic product, synroc, to immobilise and store radioactive waste. The Government is ruling that out — even the siting of a store for low-level domestic waste is a political minefield. Yet unless Australia accepts full responsibility for where its uranium ends up, within a new set of agreed global rules, it is hard to see a rush to supply India as anything but a terrible risk.