We're often told that the nuclear safeguards system 'ensures' that Australian uranium will not be diverted to produce nuclear weapons. But there is a risk of diversion, and a growing recognition of the serious flaws in the safeguards system.

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Dr Mohamed El Baradei is remarkably frank about the limitations of safeguards. In speeches and papers in recent years, Dr El Baradei has noted that the IAEA's basic rights of inspection are "fairly limited", that the safeguards system suffers from "vulnerabilities" and "clearly needs reinforcement".

Labor Party policy states that the Government will "strengthen export control regimes, and the rights and authority of the IAEA, and tighten controls on the export of nuclear material and technology."

The policy also states that the Labor Government will "only allow export of Australian uranium to countries which observe the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and which are committed to non-proliferation and nuclear safeguards."

There are one or two things the Labor Government can do to marginally improve safeguards without generating any adverse political reaction - the most obvious being increasing Australia's contribution to the safeguards budget of the IAEA.

But if the Government is serious about improving safeguards, it will need to take steps which are likely to generate opposition from uranium mining companies and from some of the countries which purchase Australian uranium.

For example, none of the nuclear weapons states is serious about its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to seriously pursue nuclear disarmament and therefore they ought not be eligible to purchase Australia's uranium. Yet uranium export agreements are in place with the US, France, the UK and China.

Russia

Earlier this year, the then Coalition government signed a uranium export agreement with Russia and the incoming Labor Government will have to decide whether to approve the agreement.

Russia is not at all serious about its NPT disarmament obligations. Indeed Russian President Vladimir Putin said on national television in October that Russia was developing new types of nuclear weapons and expanding its delivery capabilities via missiles, submarines and strategic bombers.

Another concern is inadequate security of nuclear materials in Russia. On December 1, New Scientist reported "gaping holes" in the arrangements meant to prevent the theft of nuclear materials in Russia. From 2001 to 2006, there were 183 reported trafficking incidents involving nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union.

Allowing uranium sales to Russia would not only be unconscionable, it would also be a direct breach of the Labor Party's policy to allow uranium exports only to countries which are "committed to non-proliferation".

Plutonium and spent fuel reprocessing

In addition to IAEA safeguards, countries purchasing Australian uranium must sign a bilateral agreement. The most important provisions are for prior Australian consent before Australian nuclear material is transferred to a third party, enriched beyond 20 per cent uranium-235, or reprocessed.

However no Australian government has ever refused permission to separate plutonium from spent fuel via reprocessing. Even when reprocessing leads to the stockpiling of plutonium (which can be used directly in nuclear weapons), ongoing or 'programmatic' permission has been granted by Australian governments. Hence there are stockpiles of 'Australian-obligated' plutonium in Japan and in some European countries.

At one level there is a simple solution - the Labor Government should simply ban the reprocessing of spent fuel generated from Australian uranium. The problems with reprocessing are such that the Coalition government made it illegal to build reprocessing plants in Australia, and the Labor Party assented to this legislation.

At another level, banning reprocessing of Australian-origin nuclear materials will be difficult - the uranium mining companies will bleat, and some customer countries will insist on their 'right' to do as they please with Australian nuclear materials.

Let's see if Prime Minister Rudd takes a principled stand on this issue of nuclear reprocessing or if he continues the long Australian tradition of putting profits ahead of WMD proliferations risks.

Material unaccounted for

Perhaps the most intractable problem with safeguards is that nuclear accounting discrepancies are commonplace and inevitable due to the difficulty of precisely measuring nuclear materials. The accounting discrepancies are known as Material Unaccounted For.

This problem of imprecise measurement provides an obvious loophole for anyone wanting to divert nuclear materials for weapons production. In a large plant, even a tiny percentage of the annual through-put of nuclear material will suffice to build one or more weapons with virtually no chance of detection by IAEA inspectors.

The Coalition government refused to publicly reveal any country-specific information, or even aggregate information, concerning accounting discrepancies involving Australian uranium or its by-products such as plutonium. It is to be hoped that the incoming Labor government will be more transparent.

Australians would be further disenchanted with the uranium industry if its negligible contribution to export revenue was better understood. Uranium accounts for just 0.32 per cent of Australia's export revenue - significantly less than the export revenue from cheese or wines. And the industry's contribution to employment is even more underwhelming - uranium mining accounts for .01 per cent of Australian jobs.

As the Labor Party explores and details its fairly vague promises to improve safeguards, perhaps it could reopen discussion on the broader question: do the meagre economic benefits from uranium mining outweigh the weapons proliferation risks associated with the industry?

Dr Jim Green is an anti-nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth and the Beyond Nuclear Initiative.

More information:

• Nuclear Safeguards and Australia's Uranium Exports
• Medical Association for the Prevention of War, "An Illusion of Protection: The Unavoidable Limitations of Safeguards"
• Professor Richard Broinowski, Fact or Fission? The Truth About Australia's Nuclear Ambitions, Melbourne: Scribe, 2003.