AUSTRALIA/INDIA: Uranium Export Policy Not Set In Stone - Analysts
Stephen de Tarczynski
IPS
Despite Australia’s recently confirming that it will not be exporting uranium to India -- reversing an agreement made by the previous government -- analysts argue that a deal could yet be struck.
Exporting uranium to India "will not occur under the new government because we have a long-standing commitment of not exporting uranium, Australian uranium, to nations who are not party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)," Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Stephen Smith told reporters late January, during a visit to the United States.
Last August, the Howard government broke from Australia’s hitherto position on uranium exports by agreeing to supply uranium to India, which is not a signatory to the NPT.
According to leading experts, however, the reversal of this agreement by Australia’s current government may yet be overturned, despite Labor’s policy of exporting uranium only to signatories of the NPT.
"I think the answer is ‘no’ for now," says Robert Ayson, director of graduate studies in the strategy and defence program at the Australian National University. "The government can say that quite clearly at the moment because there are a number of things that clearly aren’t finalised yet," Ayson told IPS.
The agreement made by the Howard government was subject to certain pre-conditions being met. But these requirements -- which included India completing a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the approval of civil nuclear supply to India by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) and the finalisation of the "123" agreement between India and the U.S. -- have yet to be concluded.
"The de facto NPT that the Americans and the Indians were, in a sense, trying to build around India hasn’t really happened," says Ayson.
"But if and when that de facto (NPT) was assembled around India, then it’s possible that Australia might come back, even under a Rudd government, to re-look at that question," he says.
Associate Professor Damien Kingsbury, from Deakin University’s school of international and political studies, says that Australia’s official withdrawal from the uranium agreement will "certainly ruffle the feathers in India’’.
He says that while the decision "shouldn’t come as a terrible shock to India…I’m sure that given that there was an existing agreement that the Indians will feel that any government in Australia should stick to that agreement."
Kingsbury told IPS that if the India-U.S. 123 agreement was concluded, then Australia -- with an estimated 40 percent of the world’s known uranium reserves -- would be under pressure to participate.
"It may be that if the United States goes through with its deal with India that the Australian Labor government may actually say that they are beholden, at least to part of the agreement, and may allow part of that agreement to proceed," says Kingsbury.
An indication that Australia’s position may be flexible, according to Rory Medcalf -- a former Australian diplomat in India and currently Director of the international security program at the Lowy Institute for International policy -- may be seen in its stance in the suppliers’ group.
"Indian officials now interpret Canberra’s public hints that it won’t obstruct the U.S.-India deal in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group as meaning that Australia will also come round to allowing its own uranium sales," writes Medcalf in Pragati.
But while India still appears unlikely, at least in the short term, to overcome domestic opposition in order to pass the 123 agreement, the south Asian giant is likely to continue to seek an expansion of its nuclear energy capabilities.
Ayson says that India, like all expanding economies, faces the challenge of finding the right mix of energy sources. "Simply for carbon-emission reasons, (India)] can’t rely simply on carbon-type sources," he says.
And with India’s growing status as a regional power, Ayson argues that "under any government, I think Australia wants a closer relationship with India. And that’s not been a relationship that’s been particularly easy to build in the past."
But there is little doubt that the bilateral relationship has developed in recent times. Australia is now India’s tenth largest trading partner while for India, Australia ranks ninth in terms of its trading partners. Total trade in the last financial year between the two nations was AUD 11.4 billion (10.6 billion US dollars), an increase of 32 percent from the previous year.
In a visit to India in January, Australia’s Trade Minister, Simon Crean, had discussions with India’s Minister for Trade and Commerce, Kamal Nath, on how both countries could work together in order to bring the Doha Round of trade talks to a conclusion.
Additionally, Crean conveyed Australia’s willingness to have India invited to join the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and also held preliminary talks on a potential bilateral free trade agreement.
Ayson says that intensified India-Australia trade "will take care of one important part of the bilateral relationship."
"But there is the political, security, strategic elements which remain kind of more open questions," he told IPS.
The Rudd government has already notified China that Australia will not be attending anymore so-called "quadrilateral" security talks. Instead, Australia will continue its security dialogue with the U.S. and Japan, but notably not with India.
Australia is also looking to take on a leadership role on nuclear issues. Stephen Smith has spoken of the government’s desire for Australia to be more committed "on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament matters".
Additionally, Smith has also called on the nine remaining countries whose ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CNBT) is needed to bring the treaty into force, to do so.
And to use uranium exports in order to forge closer Australia-India ties, the Rudd government would have to undertake a reversal of its own policy. "I think it would be a change. But not as big a leap as saying right now (that) we’re willing to sell uranium to India," argues Ayson.
But while Australia wants a strong relationship with a growing India, "unfinished business over uranium could make the dawning of that relationship even more difficult," he says.
Exporting uranium to India "will not occur under the new government because we have a long-standing commitment of not exporting uranium, Australian uranium, to nations who are not party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)," Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Stephen Smith told reporters late January, during a visit to the United States.
Last August, the Howard government broke from Australia’s hitherto position on uranium exports by agreeing to supply uranium to India, which is not a signatory to the NPT.
According to leading experts, however, the reversal of this agreement by Australia’s current government may yet be overturned, despite Labor’s policy of exporting uranium only to signatories of the NPT.
"I think the answer is ‘no’ for now," says Robert Ayson, director of graduate studies in the strategy and defence program at the Australian National University. "The government can say that quite clearly at the moment because there are a number of things that clearly aren’t finalised yet," Ayson told IPS.
The agreement made by the Howard government was subject to certain pre-conditions being met. But these requirements -- which included India completing a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the approval of civil nuclear supply to India by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) and the finalisation of the "123" agreement between India and the U.S. -- have yet to be concluded.
"The de facto NPT that the Americans and the Indians were, in a sense, trying to build around India hasn’t really happened," says Ayson.
"But if and when that de facto (NPT) was assembled around India, then it’s possible that Australia might come back, even under a Rudd government, to re-look at that question," he says.
Associate Professor Damien Kingsbury, from Deakin University’s school of international and political studies, says that Australia’s official withdrawal from the uranium agreement will "certainly ruffle the feathers in India’’.
He says that while the decision "shouldn’t come as a terrible shock to India…I’m sure that given that there was an existing agreement that the Indians will feel that any government in Australia should stick to that agreement."
Kingsbury told IPS that if the India-U.S. 123 agreement was concluded, then Australia -- with an estimated 40 percent of the world’s known uranium reserves -- would be under pressure to participate.
"It may be that if the United States goes through with its deal with India that the Australian Labor government may actually say that they are beholden, at least to part of the agreement, and may allow part of that agreement to proceed," says Kingsbury.
An indication that Australia’s position may be flexible, according to Rory Medcalf -- a former Australian diplomat in India and currently Director of the international security program at the Lowy Institute for International policy -- may be seen in its stance in the suppliers’ group.
"Indian officials now interpret Canberra’s public hints that it won’t obstruct the U.S.-India deal in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group as meaning that Australia will also come round to allowing its own uranium sales," writes Medcalf in Pragati.
But while India still appears unlikely, at least in the short term, to overcome domestic opposition in order to pass the 123 agreement, the south Asian giant is likely to continue to seek an expansion of its nuclear energy capabilities.
Ayson says that India, like all expanding economies, faces the challenge of finding the right mix of energy sources. "Simply for carbon-emission reasons, (India)] can’t rely simply on carbon-type sources," he says.
And with India’s growing status as a regional power, Ayson argues that "under any government, I think Australia wants a closer relationship with India. And that’s not been a relationship that’s been particularly easy to build in the past."
But there is little doubt that the bilateral relationship has developed in recent times. Australia is now India’s tenth largest trading partner while for India, Australia ranks ninth in terms of its trading partners. Total trade in the last financial year between the two nations was AUD 11.4 billion (10.6 billion US dollars), an increase of 32 percent from the previous year.
In a visit to India in January, Australia’s Trade Minister, Simon Crean, had discussions with India’s Minister for Trade and Commerce, Kamal Nath, on how both countries could work together in order to bring the Doha Round of trade talks to a conclusion.
Additionally, Crean conveyed Australia’s willingness to have India invited to join the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and also held preliminary talks on a potential bilateral free trade agreement.
Ayson says that intensified India-Australia trade "will take care of one important part of the bilateral relationship."
"But there is the political, security, strategic elements which remain kind of more open questions," he told IPS.
The Rudd government has already notified China that Australia will not be attending anymore so-called "quadrilateral" security talks. Instead, Australia will continue its security dialogue with the U.S. and Japan, but notably not with India.
Australia is also looking to take on a leadership role on nuclear issues. Stephen Smith has spoken of the government’s desire for Australia to be more committed "on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament matters".
Additionally, Smith has also called on the nine remaining countries whose ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CNBT) is needed to bring the treaty into force, to do so.
And to use uranium exports in order to forge closer Australia-India ties, the Rudd government would have to undertake a reversal of its own policy. "I think it would be a change. But not as big a leap as saying right now (that) we’re willing to sell uranium to India," argues Ayson.
But while Australia wants a strong relationship with a growing India, "unfinished business over uranium could make the dawning of that relationship even more difficult," he says.