Reports from the Associated Press and other sources tell us Australia has not remained immune to the "Georgian incident": Canberra has warned Moscow that it may put on hold agreements on uranium supplies to Russia.

Meanwhile the Kremlin has not received any Australian diplomatic note, oral or written, and nor has Russia's Nuclear Power Agency (Rosatom). And will they? If the agreement in question is heading for cancellation, both partners stand to lose a great deal. Canberra is, of course, aware of that.

The document was signed on September 7, 2007, during President Vladimir Putin's Australian visit. Its terms and provisions are simple: Russia agrees to buy $1 billion worth of uranium every year from a country which has it in surplus (40% of the world's reserves). Russia also guaranteed that the uranium would remain militarily "sterile" and be used only for peaceful purposes.

A point to note: Russia's military programs are supplied in full with its own uranium ore. In its reserves Russia ranks third in the world, as is recorded in the International Atomic Energy Agency's Red Book 2008.

But back to the Australian threat to shelve the agreement. To begin with, how that can be done when there is no agreement to speak of? It seems the Australian politicians simply had no other document at hand - could they really wave a contract for lamb supplies instead?

The agreement is strategic and looks far ahead: as planned by the contracting parties, it will kick off in 2015. The document is still not fully legitimate: parliaments have not ratified it yet. In effect, it is a peace of chalk overlay paper with state emblems on it, text conveying mutual intentions, and autographs of President Vladimir Putin and Australian Prime Minister John Howard.

Whether this paper will become a full-fledged international agreement or not is a matter for the future. And those who try to block the document today are not shouldering any risks, because the lead time is a full seven years, and the burden of responsibility will likely fall on others' shoulders.

Meanwhile, given the best-case scenario, Russian and Australian companies could start working under this agreement in 2015 - concluding contracts, building relationships, and implementing business plans. Australia, rich in uranium, could not help exciting the interest of such a nuclear heavyweight as Russia. But uranium is not like coal, which you can shovel into a furnace there and then. This ore needs technology to give it value, because only the tandem between ore and methods converts naturally occurring uranium into a nuclear fuel fit for nuclear reactors, a high-tech product. Russia, having the world's largest enrichment capacities, makes this mutual interest understandable.

Imagine an episode in which Australian companies invest in uranium workings in expectation of agreements with future Russian partners, while their own politicians come up with statements out of tune with business intentions. It is clear who stands to lose.

Rosatom is declining to comment. It says it wants no political motives affecting the nuclear branch.

Experts single out one overriding idea: all cooperation agreements, whatever the country they are concluded with, provide for mutual benefits; and if some party throws out these agreements, each of the partners suffers.