A 2005 survey of 1200 Australians found that 56% of us believe that the International Atomic Energy Agency's nuclear 'safeguards' system is ineffective.

Barely half as many believe the system is effective.

Public concern will be heightened by the Rudd Labor government's response on Thursday to a parliamentary inquiry into proposed uranium sales to Russia.

The inquiry – carried out in 2008 by the treaties committee – refused to endorse the uranium export agreement signed by John Howard and Vladimir Putin. One of the reasons was the failure of the agreement to specify meaningful safeguards arrangements to provide confidence that Australian uranium will remain in peaceful use.

The treaties committee was unmoved by the claim of the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office that "strict" safeguards conditions would "ensure" that our uranium remains in peaceful use. All the more so after Friends of the Earth revealed that there hasn't been a single International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards inspection in Russia since 2001 – information which the safeguards office conspicuously failed to provide to the committee.

But resources minister Martin Ferguson isn't fussed.

His statement on Thursday asserts that the Howard-Putin agreement "would ensure that any uranium supplied could only be used for peaceful purposes". It doesn't – but Mr Ferguson isn't going to let the facts get in the way of a good story and he isn't going to let concerns over safeguards get between the uranium mining companies and a bucket of money.

Mr Ferguson asserts that "the safeguards enshrined in the Agreement are consistent with Australia’s long-standing and strict requirements to ensure the peaceful use of Australian uranium." But that is precisely the problem, Mr Ferguson – Australia exports uranium with no requirement for IAEA inspections to take place.

Moreover, the Howard-Putin agreement makes no provision for independent, Australian inspection and verification and we are therefore totally dependent on IAEA safeguards – which are non-existent! It would be funny if it wasn't true ... and if it didn't involve feedstock for Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Responding to the treaties committee's recommendation that IAEA inspections are implemented for Russian facilities that will handle Australian uranium, the government notes that it "has no scope to implement this recommendation" and that Australia has asked the IAEA to consider additional inspections in Russia but "the IAEA has shown no inclination to do so".

The government's response to the treaties committee argues that implementing meaningful safeguards in Russia would be an unwise use of scarce resources but later argues that IAEA safeguards are "adequately resourced".

In the short term, diversion of Australian uranium for weapons production is unlikely given the size of Russia's nuclear arsenal and its stockpiles of fissile materials.

But as Kelvin Thomson, chair of the treaties committee, noted in 2008, "with uranium you have to have a system which is foolproof for hundreds of years." In the short term there is certainly a risk of theft and smuggling of Australia's uranium and its various by-products. According to recently-retired IAEA Director-General Mohamed El Baradei, only half of Russia's nuclear materials have been reasonably secured.

The government's response to the treaties committee asserts that all facilities in Russia processing Australian uranium must at least be eligible for safeguards inspections, even if those inspections are few and far between.

But this simply isn't true.

The Howard-Putin agreement explicitly provides for the processing of Australian uranium in nuclear plants that are not eligible for safeguards inspections, and Russia plans to do just that.

The government asserts that Russia is complying with its disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty even though Russia is doing no such thing. Russia's arsenal of over 14,000 nuclear weapons has an explosive yield equivalent to 200,000 Hiroshima bombs.

The reduction in the number of nuclear weapons held by Russia is no comfort since, in Putin's words, Russia plans to make its nuclear arsenal "more compact but more effective" and maintaining a nuclear arsenal "remains one of the top priorities of Russian Federation policy".

Two-thirds of the Australian population oppose uranium sales to nuclear weapons states – but Mr Ferguson isn't going to let public opinion get between uranium mining companies and a bucket of money.

Once again demonstrating its contemptuous attitude towards nuclear norms and obligations, Russia threatened Poland with nuclear strikes in 2008 and has previously threatened nuclear strikes against other neighbouring countries. You could also buy a debate on the government's assertion that "there is no evidence that Russia is in non-compliance with its obligation not to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons."

Russia's support for Iran's nuclear power program is hotly contested by many countries, not least the United States.

It's time for the government to fess up about the reality of nuclear safeguards.

They aren't strict and they don't ensure peaceful use of Australian uranium. It's time for an independent inquiry to identify measures to tighten the safeguards system.

Not another gabfest – as the Gareth Evans-led International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament turned out to be – but a focussed inquiry with real intent to address the problems.

Dr Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth and a member of the EnergyScience Coalition.